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Not so long ago, China historians used to ask if the Opium War and the treaty ports that 
resulted from it, “opened” China. It was said then, by some, that modem Chinese history 
might be written in terms o f this Western impact and its response. In answer, it has been 
pointed out by others, notably Rhodes Murphey, that whatever impact the treaty ports 
might have had, it has to be remembered that China was a huge country and that such 
impact would have been limited.1 Modem Chinese History has moved on and that debate 
is now old hat. However, like old soldiers theories don’t die. The treaty-port 
impact-and-response argument has lingered on in various forms. One o f these suggests that 
Shanghai might have been the breeding ground for a Chinese bourgeoisie.2
Recent interest in Shanghai has had the merit o f focussing attention on some very 
lively changes that were taking place from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. 
However, just as it took a great leap to argue from changes in the treaty ports for an impact 
on Chinese society, we have to somersault quite a few times to characterise the Shanghai 
financier as the Chinese bourgeoisie. The sharp historical change that is suggested by any 
reference to the supposed “emergence” of an aspect o f Chinese society runs into the 
division o f Chinese history into a pre-modem period that ends with the Opium War and a 
modem period that proceeds from it. I have never thought that the compartmentalisation 
o f Chinese history has greatly facilitated discourse between the Ming and Qing historian 
and his post-Opium War counterpart. In this paper, by questioning if  a Chinese bourgeoisie 
did come into being in Shanghai, I have very much in mind the need to broaden our 
understanding o f “modem” China by building up a discourse with its past.
Shanghai
When one thinks of modem China, one thinks o f Shanghai. Shanghai was —  and is —  the 
gateway o f the Yangzi. Shanghai was China’s foremost business and industrial centre. 
Shanghai was where people o f different cultures met: consuls, businessmen, missionaries, 
Mandarins, native bankers, compradors, vagabonds, Green Gangs, White Russians and all. 
Shanghai was a treaty port, where money was invested and more money was made. 
Shanghai was bourgeois paradise, and so one might think, this was where one should find 
the Chinese bourgeoisie.3
To jump from this lively scene in Shanghai to arguing that there was now the 
emergence of a Chinese bourgeoisie, there is just one flaw. A century before Shanghai was 
“opened” as a treaty port, in the days when it was a shanty town servicing the coastal traffic 
that brought in beans and beancakes from the North-east, China had had cities that would 
have compared favourably with late nineteenth and early twentieth century Shanghai. 
Suzhou had, for three centuries, been China's commercial city par excellence. The wealth 
o f Suzhou was legendary. Suzhou was a large rice market in its own right, but it was also 
an industrial centre, well-known in particular for its silk. Suzhou was known also for its 
consumption culture: the Sunchunyang department store was organised into six
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departments in the fashion o f the Qing imperial government. But Suzhou did not stand 
alone in the lower Yangzi: nearby were Nanjing, Yangzhou, Hangzhou, Songjiang, and 
then the many towns, Nanxun, Wuqing and so on. Suzhou lost its importance from just 
about the time that Shanghai began as a treaty port. It was occupied by the Taiping rebels 
in the 1850s and the subsequent displacement o f transport on the Grand Canal by the 
steamer going on the China coast, meant that it was never to recover its former importance. 
The geographic shift towards the coast meant that Shanghai was to replace Suzhou as the 
commercial heart o f China.4
If  Suzhou was the city of the river junk, Shanghai was the city o f the steamer. With 
the steamer came industry, the Western banks, newspapers, English and the many other 
trappings o f the post-industrial Revolution West. As one should expect, it took time for 
the population o f Shanghai to expand, and it also took time for some of this population to 
take to financing the new trade and industry and adopt a style that was to mark Shanghai 
apart from the rest o f China. We may even have to ask if  it matters when the population 
o f Shanghai began to see itself as Shanghainese. In general, we can probably say of 
Shanghai that trade came before industry, and industry before the Shanghainese identity. 
Trade came with the opening o f the port, but little more than a servicing industry came 
about until the Sino-Japanese War o f 1895 when Zhili Governor-General Li Hongzhang 
was removed from power and cotton spinning and weaving could take off in China. The 
reason for the connection o f the two events is a curious one; the Governor-General had 
been awarded a ten-year monopoly for cotton spinning but did not really try very hard to 
exercise his right. The result o f the monopoly, therefore, was that Li Hongzhang did not 
run any spinning mill in China, but then no-one else could either.5 The emergence of 
factories from 1895, nevertheless, was spectacular. Between 1897 and 1919, the number 
o f spindles in Chinese-owned cotton mills increased from 230,000 to 660,000. For 
comparison, the total number o f spindles in all o f China reached 3.5 million in 1927, of 
which 1.5 million were foreign-owned.6
It would be only too easy to argue that the people who invested in this new trade 
and industry were people o f a particular sort, that is, bourgeois rather than traditional 
merchant or scholar-official. Most were not. To see why this was so, we have to 
understand how modem industry developed in China. Up to 1895, the government was 
closely involved in the way modem industry came about in China; private enterprise 
emerged out o f this, largely from a process o f privatisation whereby government 
establishments went into the hands of whoever it was that was running them. Along with 
government enterprise and its privatisation, was the evolution o f the family firm, which 
operated with all the trappings o f the traditional Chinese family, such as the authoritarian 
father figure, the reliance on lineage holdings, nepotism and kinship networks. Why should 
one think that these businessmen were any different from businessmen in the Ming or 
earlier years as in the Qing?
But they were, and one answer comes from the operation o f the slowly evolving 
finance market. The world o f stocks and shares had some basis in traditional Chinese 
business, but the change that was introduced by the government-backed China Merchants’ 
Steam Navigation Co. is obvious. The company was founded by Governor-General Li 
Hongzhang and was, for a long time, managed by Sheng Xuanhuai. By training, Sheng 
Xuanhuai was a scholar-official, someone who studied the classics and passed the imperial 
examination like other officials o f the late nineteenth century. By temperament, much as 
we might say that Sheng Xuanhuai must have been guided strongly by the profit motive, 
it is debatable if  in this respect he was necessarily different from his fellow officials.7 The 
Qing government’s financial allocation in the nineteenth century was based on an
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antiquarian practice that had developed from the eighteenth century As it made no 
arrangement for financial changes, officials sought their own means to finance their 
administrative duties. The dubious legality o f such means gave rise now and then to 
charges o f corruption, but that does not alter the fact that Qing dynasty magistrates were 
quite used to buying and selling the rice in the granaries, or better still, converting their rice 
holdings into money and investing that with the pawnshops. By the 1900s, the Shanghai 
Circuit Intendant invested his fiscal reserves in rubber shares, the collapse o f which brought 
his government to financial bankruptcy.8
Sheng Xuanhuai’s duplicity is well worth studying as a key into modem China’s 
business elite, and we owe it to Professor Feuerwerker to have first pointed that out to us. 
Sheng spanned the two worlds o f Chinese business that was emerging in the Shanghai of 
the last two decades o f the nineteenth century, not unlike many members of the business 
elite one might meet in China today. But he was also China’s most successful company 
promoter. He leamt early to deal with stocks and shares: Li Hongzhang’s failure in cotton 
spinning notwithstanding, Sheng Xuanhuai=s subordinate, Jing Yuanshan was the first 
Chinese company promoter to sell shares through the newspaper, and he did that as the 
mood for investing in stocks and shares was changing. In the 1870s, wealthy Chinese 
people did not want to buy shares, but, because Western businesses in China were given 
protection by treaty which Chinese businesses did not receive in law, they were not adverse 
to investing in businesses owned by foreigners, or even to conducting their businesses 
under the guise o f a foreign operation. The speculative mood came about in the early 
1880s, and it does not look as if it was greatly dampened by the collapse o f the real estate 
market at the time o f the Sino-French War in 1883.1 think it is still a mystery how open 
the buying and selling o f shares was through the 1880s and perhaps the 1890s. Private 
connection certainly mattered in the 1870s: one invested less in the company than in the 
middleman who collected the share subscription; but perhaps by the 1880s, the excellent 
track record o f the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company would have persuaded 
many people that its shares were well worth buying.9
It is implicit in the dealings o f China Merchants that the Shanghai businessman did 
not trade in an open market but in one that was closely tied up with patronage networks. 
I f  administrative influence may be described along a linear scale, the backing of a 
Governor-General in a state-recognised enterprise is probably as much administrative 
influence as any Chinese business could muster in the late nineteenth century. At the other 
end o f the scale, we may think of the independent businessman. Independence in business, 
however, is surely only, in a manner o f speaking, a person working through his networks 
of family members and relatives, and how many of these could have accumulated a fortune 
without at least some official tolerance provided often because the palms had been greased? 
Not only did the Western merchant find the connections of the Chinese businessmen 
impenetrable, but even the Chinese merchants themselves, teaming up primarily with 
fellow merchants from their own provinces, realise that the social world was divided by 
dialect, origin, status as well as wealth.
I know of no systematic analysis o f the businessmen of Shanghai. Our impressions 
tell us that there were various sorts, and many have been summarised by Professor 
Bergère.10 There were the compradors for the Western companies, the returned overseas 
Chinese with perhaps also a Hong Kong connection, the local Shanghai industrialist who 
made his way from a little workshop into a reputable factory, and the Qing dynasty official- 
tumed-merchant, very much in the style o f Sheng Xuanhuai but operating on a smaller 
scale. We tend to know more, in an anecdotal fashion, about such owners o f Shanghainese 
business establishments than about their employees. As one would expect, some o f these,
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comprador or otherwise, studied for the official examination, and others, especially the 
machine workshop owners, came from humble origins. The first generation o f successful 
Shanghainese businessmen, understandably, had come from rather traditional backgrounds, 
and it would have to be the second generation that would have been influenced by whatever 
trend that might indicate a path to a successful career. The Tang brothers, Hong Kong 
educated but who became successful working for government sponsored enterprises in 
Shanghai were exceptions, and the case o f Nie Yuntai would be closer to the second- 
generation success. Nie Yuntai, the son o f one Shanghai daotai, Nie Jigui, a Li Hongzhang 
man, was educated early to be English-speaking. His wife, Zeng Jifen, daughter of 
deceased Governor-General Zeng Guofan, who once wielded more power than Li 
Hongzhang, proved her modem outlook by compiling books towards the end of the Qing 
dynasty on updating the domestic responsibility o f married women.11
One also looks in vain for a very new style o f management in Shanghai. I don’t 
think any o f the studies of businesses in Shanghai from the late Qing up to the 1930s 
demonstrated very much an inclination towards separating ownership from management, 
or to openness in accounting, or, even when share capital was raised, to very much of a 
willingness to submit to an audit. Entrepreneurs the world over, in the Ming as in the late 
Qing or the Republic, looked for opportunities and took risks, and the Shanghai investors 
chose to take considerable risks in industrial development and benefited, from among other 
things, the remittance business and real estate. One hesitates to see a separation in kind 
between the mentality o f this lot with the merchants o f the Ming and the Qing and 
Professor William Kirby is no doubt right in warning us that even when a fundamental shift 
may be said to have come along, in the promulgation o f the Company Law in 1904 we 
would be wrong to think that Chinese businessmen rushed headlong into registering their 
businesses as companies.12 Yet, despite all that, a bourgeoisie certainly did come into shape 
in Shanghai. The decisive evidence, I believe, comes from Professor Xiong Yuezhi, who 
noted that the first appearance o f the Shanghai identity came in the demonstration of the 
Shanghai merchants in 1900 under the title “the gentry merchants o f Shanghai”.13 Mary 
Rankin might have dated the occurrence o f a common outlook somewhat earlier, and for 
my purpose, I am quite prepared to accept that between 1880 and 1900 some conscious 
formulation had come into existence o f a Shanghainese business interest.14
We should look back at Suzhou. Is it possible that the Suzhou merchants in the 
eighteenth century would not have realized they were the gentry merchants o f Suzhou? 
Surely, they referred to themselves as gentry, but I know o f no document in which they 
might present themselves as gentry and merchants.15 In the case o f Foshan, near 
Guangzhou, the city gentry even made clear that despite their economic success, they 
wanted the town to be known, not for its business, but for its relatively colourless literati 
achievements.16 In claiming to be the gentry merchants o f Shanghai, a new type o f identity 
seems to have appeared, and the problem for me is that it had not appeared with a new 
mentality or a new style o f doing business. What did this identity consist of? Where did 
it lead?
Business structure and political status
When the Shanghainese businessman began to identify his interest with Shanghai, he did 
so at a time when the relationship between centre and periphery in China was rapidly 
changing. The late Qing reforms from 1904 introduced the Merchants’ Law, the Company 
Law and the Chamber of Commerce Law. They brought an end to the official examination 
in 1905. And in the few years to come, the reforms overhauled the entire Chinese
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government, establishing for the first time in China the right o f the citizen to vote, even if 
not necessarily the right to choose his own chief minister. These were momentous changes 
in imperial China that led finally to its fall.17 The empire was succeeded in 1912 by a 
republic, and that confirmed, perhaps, the golden age o f business that had begun in 1900.
The Company Law made it possible to alter the structure o f Chinese business, just as the 
Merchants’ Law, the Chamber o f Commerce Law, the abolition o f the official examination 
and the institution o f election, made it possible to alter the status o f the merchant. From 
those reforms, China was propelled into modernity, for although the internal structuring of 
business did not see great changes, the relationship o f the businessman to the state was 
quite altered. The structuring o f business within society and the businessman’s political 
status were quite related.
What was the change that was brought about by the new legislation? No less than 
a fundamental overhaul o f the political regime. The process began shortly after the shock 
o f the Sino-Japanese War, in the incident known as the One Hundred Days o f Reform. 
Traditional wisdom on this incident follows the interpretation that the participant-recorder 
o f the event, Liang Qichao, wanted his readers to believe. According to Liang, the reformer 
Kang Yuwei had wanted to save China by introducing political reforms, and had in fact 
proceeded to do so with the support of the young emperor Guangxu. Those reforms were 
aborted when they were discovered by the arch-conservative Dowager Empress, who in 
what amounted to a coup d ’etat, deprived the emperor o f the real power to rule and 
beheaded six of Kang Yuwei’s supporters, while Kang and Liang escaped barely with their 
lives. The dramatic colours o f the incident have, since Liang published his account, made 
their way from academic works into popular literature. And one episode has stood out that 
has been very hard to explain. The reformer Kang Yuwei had made himself famous, before 
he was given any official appointment, when he led the examination candidates of 1895 in 
Beijing in protest against the inability o f the officialdom to deal with the crisis that the 
dynasty was facing. Thereafter, the senior official Weng Tonghe, who had been the young 
emperor’s tutor, took Kang Yuwei to the emperor, and there Kang received his 
appointment. Professor Luke Kwong, has shown, convincingly to my mind, that this direct 
petition to the throne never took place.18 But that, surely, was the first sign of the 
constitutional change that was to come to the Qing dynasty. Hitherto, the emperor had 
received petitions only from senior officials and his trusted servants. Uninvited direct 
access to the throne was unknown. Where, indeed, was the empire coming to if  commoners 
might approach the throne direct?
At the time Liang Qichao was writing, however, such a question would indeed have 
been troubling the Qing Court, and possibly no less a personage than the Empress 
Dowager. The events were complicated, and again Professor Luke Kwong’s succinct 
analysis gives us some guidance. Kang Yuwei, according to Professor Kwong, was not as 
central to the reformist regime as Liang Qichao had made out. One may detect a political 
vacuum at court at the demise o f Governor-General Li Hongzhang, who had taken the 
blame for China’s defeat in the Sino Japanese War, and senior court officials were possibly 
jostling for influence. Nor did the Empress Dowager necessarily find reforms in themselves 
as objectionable as Liang Qichao might have wanted his readers to believe: what had 
aroused her suspicion was the rumour that the reformers might have had the backing of 
foreigners.19 She was probably quite desperate when she had to turn to the village gangs 
known as the Boxers for support, and her loss of faith in the officialdom was well justified 
when the southern Governor-Generals declared their independence as Beijing came under 
foreign attack.20 The imperial court left Beijing to foreign military occupation and upon 
its return, it knew fully well its weaknesses had been exposed. The next few years o f Qing
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rule saw the imperial court, still very much under the control o f the Empress Dowager, 
making up for its weaknesses. It reformed the army, it produced the commercial legislation 
to satisfy the interests of foreigners, it raised taxes through extra impositions, and it was to 
proceed onto constitutional reform, so that popular representation would balance the 
influence o f its officialdom. A most decisive demonstration o f its willingness to change 
was the abolition o f the imperial examination. The imperial examination had, since the 
Ming dynasty, been the cornerstone of the Chinese status structure. Society was never to 
be the same again.
One cannot exaggerate the impact o f the crisis o f 1900 and the subsequent reform. 
The impact o f the reform was to alter quite fundamentally the organisation of Chinese 
society. Late Qing society had essentially incorporated various tenets which had been built 
into Ming dynasty government. The first Ming emperor, Taizu (r. 1368-1398), had 
inherited a status-oriented legal structure, whereby the population o f the realm had been 
demarcated by occupation or ethnic origin, and according to one’s legal status, corvee 
service had to be fulfilled. It is hard for us nowadays to imagine how these occupational 
statuses retained by the early Ming into the fifteenth century were put to practical use. By 
Ming law, the artisan households continued to provide service in the construction of the 
palaces, or at the imperial looms or the kilns, while the saltern household made salt, the 
military household provided soldiers, and only the civilian household, the minhu, provided 
no more than the usual run-around duties at the local magistrate’s office. It is well-known 
that such service was greatly abhorred by the early Ming population, and Professor Liu 
Zhiwei in Zhongshan University, Guangzhou, has shown why. The reason corvee service 
was not acceptable, was not only that no-one who could afford to pay money in lieu of 
service wanted the hard work, but also that the amount o f work that might be demanded out 
o f corvee service was essentially arbitrary. Throughout the first half of the Ming dynasty, 
the increasing supply o f monetary silver allowed a gradual move from arbitrary taxation 
demands towards systematic taxation. The famous Single-Whip Method, as systematic 
taxation came to be called, tied corvee service to land tax, so that a single sum was payable 
in silver that was calculated purely from land holding, even though payment in grain 
continued to be demanded o f some varieties o f land. This unified land tax, which was 
introduced gradually in the Ming and was systematically recorded in the early Qing in the 
Complete Book o f  Land and Labour Service (fuyi quanshu). A calculable tax-base became 
the mainstay of the fiscal strength o f the Qing dynasty, and until the collection o f land tax 
was disrupted by the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century, it was land tax that 
was the main component o f government taxation.21
Coupled with the evolution of a monetary economy and systematic taxation was the 
devolution o f household registration. The taxation system that was based on status 
demanded that service-providing households be registered, and an ingenious method was 
developed whereby this was done. The term lijia, by which the method was known, defies 
translation: households were registered in groups known as li and jia  and tax services 
rotated among them. Grossly misunderstood, the lijia has been interpreted as a measure 
enforced from above that was effective for a while in the early Ming and that then went into 
decline. Nothing could be further from the truth. The rotation o f duties for the sake of 
religious worship had been common among household groups, and what appeared as a legal 
requirement enforced from above required the recognition by the imperial government of 
liturgical arrangements that had long been accepted in the villages. Nor did the lijia go into 
decline. On the contrary, after its introduction primarily in the lower Yangzi in the early 
Ming it was extended to other parts o f China, but, as it was extended, corvee service was 
replaced by taxation in silver, and lijia registration survived only as a tax account even as
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liturgical rotation continued in territorial religious worship. As the lijia evolved, in the 
sixteenth century came the definitive change that gave Chinese society the character by 
which it was known to the student of modem Chinese society. That change was the rise 
o f the degree-holding lineage.
The importance o f the imperial examination to Chinese society is legendary. To 
appreciate the rise of the degree-holding lineage in the sixteenth century, it is necessary to 
realize that for most of the Yuan dynasty, no imperial examinations were held. In the early 
Ming therefore, there were few degree-holders. As examinations were held every few years 
from the early Ming as one might expect, the number o f degree-holders increased, the 
degree was slowly but surely devalued, and the universal standards encouraged by the 
examination gave rise to an ethos that placed a premium on the scholarship that was 
examined.22 It took time for the Ming scholarly literati to build up its consciousness, and 
in the Ming it weathered several crises as it did so. Land-holding, imperial recognition and 
local prestige had much to do with the final compromise that was worked out between the 
emperor and the literati. The literati tradition stressed the pre-eminence o f rituals in its 
relationship to the imperial regime, while the emperor stressed the need for loyalty, a 
quality that backfired on various occasions when the emperor himself might be construed 
as a usurper o f the throne. But it was upward mobility that eventually settled how society 
was to be ordered. The distinguishing quality o f the Ming aristocracy had, in the tradition 
o f the aristocracy of previous dynasties, been the legal prerogative to sacrifice to numerous 
generations o f ancestors in a building of a legally defined style known as a “family temple” 
(fiamiao). When the degree-holders emerged as a self-conscious status group, and as they 
imitated the rituals o f the aristocracy, the “family temple” had been spreading, even before 
the law was changed to permit it to spread to non-aristocratic households. When the law 
was eventually changed in the sixteenth century to allow officials to build “family 
temples”, the trend had been set whereby degree-holding households would compile written 
genealogies, hold land and conduct sacrifice to ancestors in a lineage “family temple”. In 
the same way as an aristocratic practice through upward social mobility seeped downwards 
into society lineage building around the “family temple” continued from the sixteenth into 
the eighteenth century. As the economy prospered, as wealth was accumulated and as more 
people sat the imperial examinations and were awarded degrees, the “family temples” 
became the accepted centres o f local society. By the eighteenth century “family temples” 
were found in most parts o f China. The grandest and largest number, understandably, 
being found in the wealthiest parts, as these were precisely the areas that also produced the 
largest number o f successes in the official examinations.23
By the sixteenth century, the essential ingredients o f what the twentieth century 
scholar might recognise as traditional Chinese society were in place. The Chinese state was 
ruled by an emperor, but he was supported by an officialdom. An examination governed 
entry into the officialdom, and the degree-holder or his surrogate, acted as the intermediary 
between the government and local society. The Western literature on Chinese history has 
referred to this go-between as the gentry class, even though holding a degree was probably 
less a class attribute and more a status. The shenshi, which the English word “gentry” has 
been used as a translation, was widely considered the social equivalent o f the official. Of 
course, no hard-and-fast rule determined the degree one must obtain in order to become 
shenshi; the more degrees one’s neighbours had already acquired, the higher must one’s 
own be in order to be noticeable. But if  in this way the shenshi in a very genuine sense 
became an elite, and preparation for as well as pursuit o f an official career its ostensible life 
style, one did not necessarily have to acquire a degree in order to share its status. Ancestral 
worship, the extended family, the ancestral hall, the maintenance o f family and lineage
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properties, ensured that elite status was accorded not only to the individual but also to the 
family, and by extension the lineage. This is why not all Chinese farmers were “peasants”; 
they were descendants o f senior officials and important scholars, and even if  they were 
illiterate, they would have been proud o f their lineage’s literati achievements.
Where did business and the merchant fit into all this? O f course, what China went 
through in the sixteenth centuiy amounted to a commercial revolution, the details o f which 
we may find in the literature that has been produced and reproduced on the theme known 
as the “sprouts of capitalism”.24 O f course, Chinese businessmen traded, the small ones in 
the local markets, those on a larger scale moving goods across geographic regions within 
China or across the seas, and the substantial players were the land developers on the river 
deltas, the financiers running pawn-shop chains, and the bidders at the government 
monopolies such as in the salt trade. However, not only did these businessmen operate 
under no law that guaranteed due process of arbitration, but many were also engaged in the 
types of trade that the law would have considered illegitimate. For evidence, one only has 
to turn to the many records describing “local strong men” (tuhao) and “salt smugglers” 
(yanxiao). Although trade was recognised as an independent sphere o f social activity, 
merchants, collectively, did not ever acquire the status o f an estate in the way degree- 
holders did. Custom and the inefficiency o f the imperial government to put the terms of its 
law into practice made the prospering o f business possible, but, understandably, 
businessmen trading under uncertain legality sought protection. And the providers of 
patronage were none other than degree-holders who succeeded in wielding influence within 
the government bureaucracy. This is why we see so many instances, from the mid-Ming 
onwards, o f the centrality of degree-holding in the establishment o f respectability. 
Successful merchants wanted degrees, for themselves or their sons, merchant guilds 
established guildhalls in the guise of examination hostels, and land developers built “family 
temples”, which established their literati status for all to see. Unlike the West, where 
intellectuals in support o f individualism stood up in the name o f “society” to hold their 
kings in check, in China, the literati in support o f the lineage stood up in the name o f ritual 
to stake out a claim for freedom of action. Ming and Qing China could not invent the 
business company; it made do with the lineage, with all its emphasis on the collective good, 
the literati image, and loyalty to the emperor.
And this is why the reforms o f the early years o f the 1900s were so important. By 
abolishing the examination, they abolished degree-holding; by instituting commercial 
legislation, they recognised the status o f the merchants; and by moving towards 
representative government, they freed local society for experimentation. The early modem 
China o f the Ming and Qing came to an end in 1905. The Revolution of 1911 was a 
consequence o f that.
THE EMERGENCE OF A SOCIAL CLASS
Nevertheless, social classes do not emerge overnight. M arx’s distinction between the 
emergence o f the conditions that make the class, and the emergence o f that much more 
intangible aspect o f class relation, its consciousness o f itself, is relevant here as elsewhere. 
The changes introduced in the early 1900s were for the most part, external to the formation 
o f a class o f merchants or financiers. After 1900, the businessman had gained his foothold 
o f political recognition and it would be tempting to argue that henceforth bourgeois 
institutions would emerge whereby bourgeois interests were served. Yet, if  one looks 
carefully at the evidence, the trends are often quite contradictory. Recent research on the 
chambers o f commerce from the last years o f the Qing to the 1920s, for instance, has shown
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merchants actively organising to press their interests. Professor William Rowe, looking at 
the evidence in Hankow in the 1880s found merchants standing up sufficiently to the 
demands that might be made on them by the government to warrant thinking that a “civil 
society” might have been found in China well before the late Qing reforms, while Professor 
Frederic Wakeman, looking at Shanghai in the 1930s, found the invidious hand o f the 
government so disruptive that he cautioned against a blanket use o f the term.25 I tend to 
believe that Chinese merchants had, since the Ming traded within patronage networks, and 
so I am not surprised there is some truth in both arguments, although, for my part, I would 
not care for thinking much about the existence or otherwise o f a “civil society” in China 
at all. The Chinese intellectual held his own in the face o f imperial authority not by 
appealing to the independence o f society from the state but to the time-honoured sanctity 
of rituals to which even the emperor must submit. It was not a social order but a ritual 
order that governed the limits o f authority in China; the emergence of a social order to take 
the place o f the ritual order was very much the essence of the historical change that came 
about in the early 1900s.
Nevertheless, I would concede that the constitutional changes after 1900 were so 
substantial that one might indeed begin to think about a new social structure in the making. 
I would stress the tentativeness of the changes o f the early 1900s, and the uncertainties that 
accompanied them. In the early 1900s, for instance, Westerners had good reasons to worry, 
not about the lack o f recognition for merchants, but for the law to grant them so much 
power that the courts might be unable to hold their own against Chinese mercantile 
interests. A.M. Kotenev, writing in 1925 about the Shanghai Mixed Court, noted in 
particular the authority of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in arbitration. The Chamber 
o f Commerce Law of 1904 had given the chambers o f commerce the power of arbitration, 
and the Bankruptcy Law of the same year (which was repealed in 1908) made them rather 
than the court the agencies for winding up proceedings. According to Kotenev, most courts 
continued to refer cases o f arbitration to the guilds rather than the chambers o f commerce, 
and in the Shanghai Mixed Court, where the magistrates did refer cases to the Shanghai 
Chamber o f Commerce, Westerners found the arrangement extremely unsatisfactory 
because its “methods for arriving at a decision by arbitration were not always above 
suspicion”.26 Only after the Revolution o f 1911, what Kotenev referred to as the “almost 
exclusive privilege” of the Chamber of Commerce in commercial arbitration foundered, for 
then the choice o f the arbitrator came to be left to the litigants.
Another incident that illustrates succinctly the growth of a mercantile interest, again 
with a foothold in a national stake, was the success o f the Shanghai share-holders o f the 
Bank o f China in standing up for their interests in 1916. As President Yuan Shikai was 
dying, the Chinese government ordered the Bank of China and the Bank o f Communication 
to stop payment in silver for notes they had issued. The Shanghai share-holders o f the 
Bank o f China, with the support o f the foreign exchange banks, decided to disregard the 
government order and to continue to honour the notes issued by the Shanghai branch. By 
this act o f defiance, the share-holders in Shanghai succeeded in stemming the rush on the 
Bank of China in Shanghai and held steady the paper currency issued in Shanghai even as 
the paper notes o f Beijing sharply depreciated. The Shanghai share-holders, thereby, 
demonstrated their independence from Beijing. However, as the North China Herald 
pointed out, this was really a triumph for foreign bankers, for not one native bank had 
helped the afflicted Chinese modem banks. The following taken from a letter written by 
a Chinese correspondent on behalf o f the Chinese bankers shows why:
It is true that ‘not one of the Chinese mercantile or financial corporations has lifted a finger
to help either o f the three afflicted banks’, but it is equally true that there was an order of
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moratorium from Peking and that the foreign banks or firms contemplating to finance these 
three banks found it necessary to protect themselves by obtaining the permission from their 
Ministers in Peking first. In view o f the order o f moratorium similar permission or 
protection by the Chinese government to the Chinese merchants was out o f the question, 
in fact with such an order in force, it might be interpreted by the Peking Government as 
a criminal offence to render any help to those banks against the effect o f the order.
With no protection or security for the support that the Chinese merchants might have 
given, but with every chance o f being charged with the offence o f violating the Cabinet 
Order from Peking and o f aiding and abetting the revolutionists (because it was generally 
believed that by moratorium the government meant to requisition the silver reserve of the 
banks for the payment o f its troops and for conducting a campaign against the South) —  
with all these difficulties in view, it is no wonder that ‘there is not a hint o f one copper 
cash being offered by the Chinese themselves to tide over difficulties’ and that ‘it is always 
the foreigner that has done the practical work’.27
An obvious shift had come about in the position of the Shanghai mercantile community in 
its victory over the central government. It had been a victory with more than a local 
connotation: the Shanghai financial market had it known that it would not answer to the 
beck and call o f the Beijang government and the message should be loud and clear that 
Shanghai was China’s financial centre working to its own rules. Yet, the foreign banking 
connection shows that it was not an independent financial centre. One might say that the 
Western influence gave safe haven, but might one not also argue that the safe haven had 
only been needed because the arms o f the central government extended up to but not into 
the boundaries o f the international settlement? Shanghai was unique, having been conferred 
its power by the concentration o f economic development, but the question that must be 
asked of whether the golden age o f the bourgeoisie that was restricted so much to Shanghai 
should be thought o f as a phenomenon representative o f all o f China. Indeed, one should 
ask how China tom between warlords could have produced very much o f a bourgeois 
golden age except in Western-protected Shanghai.
The obvious retort to this argument is that the emergence o f the bourgeoisie 
produced an impact on culture that went far beyond Shanghai. But this retort ignores the 
fact that the shifts in culture that followed 1900 were not bourgeois, but Chinese, and they 
applied not only to the rich, but, to a much greater extent, also to what appeared initially 
as the “petty bourgeoisie” (xiao shimin), a term which with reference to its subject matter 
could better be translated as the “common man”. Two points need be made with respect 
to this argument, and they were made recently in a doctoral thesis at Oxford by Henrietta 
Harrison.28 The first is that indeed social structure was changing in the early Republic, but 
the terminology that described the new society was not founded on class but on the concept 
o f the “constituency” (jie) which itself was founded on the imperial theory o f the “four 
people” (simin). The second is that the late Qing reforms, the 1911 Revolution and the 
political events o f the early years o f the Republic had brought about vast and rapid changes 
in rituals and manners that spread far and wide in Chinese society. Such changes had 
spread from the cities and their consequence was to produce a city-rural divide rather than 
a class divide. Let me elaborate on these two points just a little.
In my view, the two arguments are related, especially in the battleground of ideas 
that was the 1910s and 1920s. By the 1930s, the language o f class was settling in, but in 
the 1910s and 1920s it was the functional theory of social constituencies, the “jie”, and not 
the conflict theory o f social classes, that dominated political discourse. As Henrietta 
Harrison shows, the crowds that appeared in the marches o f the 1920s described themselves 
as the “students’ constituency”, “merchants’ constituency”, and even “women’s 
constituency”. The “merchants’ constituency” might have been organised by the guilds and
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the chambers o f commerce, but they were not necessarily any more bourgeois than the 
students. Not by any stretch o f imagination would one think that the May 4th was 
restricted to a class o f merchants and financiers, and the students o f Beijing University 
continued not only as activists but also as civil servants and teachers. Nor was it only the 
radical literature o f the May 4th that was produced in the presses o f Shanghai. The 
popularity o f the Mandarin-Duck-and-Butterfly literature continued until the generation 
trained in the classics was replaced by that trained in the post-1905 curriculum.29 The 
reforms in rituals and manners, that is to say, in hair-style, in dress codes, in body gestures, 
in the adoption o f new festivals and the Western calendar, in the use of national flags and 
songs, and in the respect paid to heroes and martyrs did not reflect a demarcation o f class, 
but the demarcation o f the Republican national. The various constituencies were 
components o f the Republican nation, and for this reason, represented the wholeness of the 
nation rather than conflict that might be reduced to ownership o f different means o f 
production.
The more rapid adoption of Republican rituals and manners in the cities than in the 
countryside resulted in an emphasis given to the city, and especially Shanghai, in the 
Republican image of state and society. Whereas Ming and Qing China would have 
promoted a view o f the realm that was governed by imperial control over registered 
households, most o f which were located in villages, the Republican view o f society was 
made up o f a state supported by its occupational constituencies, most of which were based 
in the larger cities. The Shanghai view o f Republican society created the image that the 
Shanghai businessmen made up the bourgeoisie o f China. Given time, there might even 
come into play a national bourgeoisie in which the Shanghainese businessmen played a 
central part. However, strong state control, war and then communism brought an end to 
the independence o f the Shanghai bourgeoisie. In reality, the Shanghai bourgeoisie did not 
ever become a Chinese bourgeoisie for there simply was not a Chinese bourgeoisie.
In the place o f a Chinese bourgeoisie, China saw many bourgeois classes. The 
splash in the 1910s and 1920s in Shanghai was magnified many times by the development 
o f separate bourgeoisies in Japanese-occupied Taiwan, post-1949 Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
and then post-1980 China.30 In the tradition o f the literati o f times past, they claim 
independence from the political realm, and in doing so might all in one way or another, 
subscribe to the May 4th ideal, but they had followed different destinies and argued for 
vastly different outcomes for a political China. The various Chinese bourgeoisies are 
characterised by differences as well as similarities, similar primarily in all thinking of 
themselves as being Chinese, and different in their tastes, habits, work styles, reactions to 
things Western and inclinations towards freedom of interference from the government. The 
day may come yet when China will be united under one bourgeoisie. It is fallacious to think 
that that happened at the end o f the Qing dynasty or the early years o f the Republic.
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